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THE specific object of the marriage coo· 
tract is that of establishing the patrimon· 
ial or property regime which is to govern 
che relations between husband and wife. It 
is favourably looked upon by positive law, 
which grants to the parties the liberty to 
regulate their relations in the way which 
is more convenient to them and dispenses 
them from certain legal conditions. 
Italian law as it stands today deals with 
the patrimonial regime of the family in 
Chapter VI of Title VI of Book I · of the Ci· 
vil Code. The first article of this Chapter 
(art. 159) declares that the patrimonial re-
lationships between the spouses are regu• 
lated (i) by those agreements Cconvenzio-
ni ') into which the parties have entered, 
and (ii) by the law. The contents of t~ese 
matrimonial agreements can be freely fixed 
by the parties, so long as they are destin-
ed to regulate the patrimonial situation of 
the spouses during marriage, so that even 
donations in contemplation of marriage can 
form the object of such an agreement (art. 
785). Hence the Italian Courts have also 
considered as a valid matrimonial conven· 
tion that in which the parents of the spous· 
es promise to provide for the patrimonial 
interests of the new family (Corte di Cas-
sazione, 7 February, 1952). 
Matrimonial conventions or marriage 
contracts, however, are not coo frequent. 
In fact, in many regions in Italy it is today 
rare to come across stipulations of solemn 
ouptial pacts dealing either with the tradi-
tional institute of dowry or the more recent 
creacioo of the family patrimony Cpatrimon-
io famHiare') which has scarcely entered 
into practice. Rather there e:z:ists a legal 
regime consisting of the separation of 
goods ('separazione dei beni•). The hus· 
band may do what he wants with his patri· 
mony and the wife retains full autonomy 
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over her own personal goods, saving her 
obligation to contribute to the expenses 
of marriage. Nevertheless, it is a fact that 
the husband still often administers his 
wife's goods, even without an express sti-
pulation to that effect. In such an eventual· 
ity and so as to safeguard the wife's rights, 
the law provides that the husband is sub-
ject to the obligations of a usufructuary 
(art. 213); if, as usually happens, the hus• 
band has enjoyed his wife's goods without 
a 
1
procura1 and without any written opposi· 
tion on her part, he is bound, on the dis· 
solution of the marriage, to give up merely 
those fruits still in existence (art. 212). 
But as regards the conventional regimes, 
the law is still in force and is in some res• 
pects similar co and in others completely 
different from ours dealing with marriage 
contracts. Thus, the spouses, in their mar· 
riage contract, cannot derogate any of the 
rights due to the head of the family, nor 
any rights as the law attributes to either 
of. the spouses (art. 160). No mention is 
made, as in our section 1282, of tutorship, 
minority, emancipation of children, or pro-
hibitory rules of law, derogation from the 
rules of which is forbidden. Noteable also 
is the absence of any norm stipulating that 
agreements whereby all or some of the 
children are to be brought up in the mo· 
ther' s religion are valid. But then follows 
a general principle that the spouses can• 
not agree in a generic way· that their pat• 
rimooial relationships are to be regulated 
wholly or in part by laws to which they 
are not subject or by usage, but must dec-
lare in a concrete manner the contents of 
the agreements by which they intend to re-
gulate their relations (art.161). 
Marriage agreements must be stipulated 
by public deed, under pain of nullity. They 
CANNOT be AMENDED after the celebration 
of the marriage, though the modification 
may be more favourable, but CA..'il be STIPU· 
LATED after the celebration of the marriage 
in such cases as the /au, contemplates, 
provided they do not alter marriage agree· 
ments already established (art. 162), and 
in such instance the presence of both 
spouses is not essential. The cases con-
templated by the law relate to the consci· 
tucioo of a family patrimony (art. 167), the 
constitution of a dowry (art. 178) and the 
constitution of a community of profits and 
acquisitions (art. 215). 
Our law (s. 1288(1)) allows variations co 
be made even after marriage provided that 
the spouses have the authority of the Court 
and without any prejudice to the rights of 
the children or of third parties, and provid· 
ed also that such variations are made io a 
public deed (s. 1289) and registered in the 
Public Registry (s. 1290), the notary hav· 
ing also to draw up a note of reference 
(s. J 291). 
When amend men ts to marriage contracts 
are made before marriage, the Italian posi-
tion is chat they have no effect Wlless 
they are stipulated by a public deed in the 
presence and with the simultaneous con• 
sent of all persons who were parties to the 
marriage contract (art. 163); so too under 
our law (s. 1287). However, any amendment 
is without effect with respect to third per· 
sons unless a notation referring to the deed 
containing the amendment is made on the 
margin of the original marriage contract. 
The notation is to be made on the copy of 
the marriage contract filed in the public 
archives by the notary who received it cvid 
also on the copy s~bmitted for ttanscrip-
cioo, if the marriage contract bas been 
transcribed (art. 163), which it muse be if 
dealing with immovables. 
No proof of simulation in marriage agree-
ments is admissible, even if such proof is 
shown by written counterdeclarations. 
These counterdeclaracions can have effect 
only as to those between whom they cake 
place and only if made in the presence and 
with the simultaneous consent of all per· 
sons who were parties co the marriage con· 
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tract (arc. 164). No such limited effect is 
apparent under our law. 
As regards capacity, the traditional rule 
'babilis ad auptias, habilis ad pacta nup-
tialia' is not always followed toda~· and 
the minor must generally be assisted by 
the same persons who consent to his mar· 
riage, i.c-. by the parent exercising pacern· 
al authority, the guardian, the curator in 
the case of an emancipated minor, or the 
special curator appointed purposely to as-
sist the minor in drawing up the marriage 
agreements (art. 165). With regard to disabl-
ed persons, the assistance of the curator 
previously appointed is necessary for the 
validity of stipulations and donations made 
in the marriage contract by such a disabl· 
ed person or by a person against whom an 
action for a declaration of disability has 
been instituted (art. 166). Under our law, 
marriage agreements entered into by minors 
(where the father is absent, dead, inter-
dicted, or of unsound mind) or by di sabled 
persons are to be authorised by the Court. 
Italian law provides for three regimes 
that can be set up by marriage agreements. 
These three regimes have already been re-
ferred to but it is fitting to discuss them 
briefly. They are: a family patrimony, a 
dowry and a community of acquests. 
The constitution of a family patrimony 
aims at securing to the family c;ertain spe-
cified immovable property or negotiable 
insuuments Ctitoli di credito') llthich are 
thereby rendered inalienable and render-
ing any fruits the immediate property and 
enjoyment of the family. This patrimony 
cao be constituted even during marriage 
by one or both spouses or by a third party 
who, however, is entitled to retain owner· 
ship of the goods. The administration of 
this property lies with the spouse to whom 
it belongs. If the property belongs co both 
spouses or to a third person the adminis-
tration will lie with the designated spouse 
and in lack of such designation, with the 
husband. The family patrimony is dissolv· 
ed on the dissolution of marriage though if, 
on the death of one spouse, there are child-
ren, the bond remains till the last child at· 
tains majority. 
The constitution of a dou.ry has today 
lost much of its importance, mainly be-
cause of the oegaci ve consequences deri v-
ing from the inalienability of the goods 
forming the object of the dowry, i.e. such 
property as the wife or others on her be-
half brings expressly as dowry to the hus-
band to sustain the burdens of marriage. 
One must here point out thac constituting 
a dowry by will is considered as null un-
der Italian law. From this I submit that 
one can imply that even a renunciation of 
succession in return for a dowry or dona-
tion in contemplation of marriage (an ag-
reement permitted under our law by s. 
1284(2)) would be invalid. In fact, article 
458 of the Italian Civil Code expressly 
lays down that 'Any agreement by which 
one disposes of his own succession .is 
void' and further that 'Any act by which 
one disposes of the rights chat can belong 
to him by a succession not yet opened, or 
renounces such right, is equally void'. 
That this applies even to marriage con-
tracts is clear from what the Corte di Cas-
sazione said on the 22nd May 1959 that: 
'Patti successori vietati dalla legge' com· 
prendono 'anche ogni convenzione che ab-
bia per oggetto di costituire, modificare, 
trasmettere o esdnguere dirittl relati vi a 
una successione non aacora aperta.' 
And while on succession, as regards 
the varying of the legal order of succes-
sion which is dealt with by section 1283 
of our Civil Code and which provides for 
its invalidity, the fact chat no mention of 
it is made in Italian law under the Chapter 
dealing with 'Marriage Contracts' would 
also render it invalid, and this in accord-
ance with general principles. Besides, 
with regard to such promises made in mar· 
riage contracts as are mentioned by our 
law in section 1284(l)(a), (b) and (c)* and 
which are thereby dedared valid, the fact 
that are not expressly or otherwise listed 
under the aforesaid Chapter would also 
render them invalid. 
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Finally, the last regime that can be es-
tablished by the spouses is the community 
of acquests which is an instirutioo seldom 
put into practice in Italy, unlike our law 
where it aucomacically takes effect when 
the marriage is celebrated. The community 
consists of the enjorment of present and 
future goods of the spouses and such pro-
perty as is acquired during marriage under 
any title, except through donation, heredity 
or legacy. Administration vests with the 
husband who can even alienate goods in 
the community so long as he does so by 
onerous title. Once the community is dis-
solved, the goods contained in it are di-
vided equally between the spouses, saving 
the relevant 'pcelevamenti' or any different 
proportions that may have been establish· 
ed in the matrimonial agreemencs. 
To conclude I must point out chat in Ita-
ly, legislation is being prepared to bring 
about far-reaching changes in connection 
with the patrimonial regime of the family. 
Thus, the concept of the husband as the 
sole bread-winner of the family - already 
somewhat varied by the wife's Constitu-
tional right to work - may, in the near fu-
ture, be further relegated by certain provi-
sions whereby the wife .may in certain cas-
es be obliged to work. Moreover, various 
innovations as regards the economic go-
vernment of the family are also foresee-
able. 
• 1284(1) A promise made in a marriage coo• 
tract by the parent of one of the future spous-
es to such future spouse -
(a) not co leave to such future spouse out of 
his or her estate a portion smaller chao th at 
which such future spouse would take on ao in· 
testacy, or 
(b) not to diminish such portion by any dona-
tion in favour of his or her other children or of 
any other person, or 
(c) not co give or leave, by donation or will, 
to any of his or her other children more than 
chat which he or she would give or leave to 
such future spouse, shall be valid. 
